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ABSTRACT
In the past year, a new spamming scheme has emerged: sexual ex-
tortion messages requiring payments in the cryptocurrency Bitcoin,
also known as sextortion. This scheme represents a rst integration
of the use of cryptocurrencies by members of the spamming indus-
try. Using a dataset of 4,340,736 sextortion spams, this research aims
at understanding such new amalgamation by uncovering spammers’
operations. To do so, a simple, yet eective method for projecting
Bitcoin addresses mentioned in sextortion spams onto transaction
graph abstractions is computed over the entire Bitcoin blockchain.
This allows us to track and investigate monetary ows between
involved actors and gain insights into the nancial structure of sex-
tortion campaigns. We nd that sextortion spammers are somewhat
sophisticated, following pricing strategies and beneting from cost
reductions as their operations cut the upper-tail of the spamming
supply chain. We discover that one single entity is likely controlling
the nancial backbone of the majority of the sextortion campaigns
and that the 11-month operation studied yielded a lower-bound
revenue between $1,300,620 and $1,352,266. We conclude that sex-
tortion spamming is a lucrative business and spammers will likely
continue to send bulk emails that try to extort money through
cryptocurrencies.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the past year, a new spamming scheme has emerged: sexual
extortion messages requiring payments in the cryptocurrency Bit-
coin, known as sextortion spam. The threat is about the disclosure
of compromising images and/or videos to the recipient’s contacts if
an amount of money is not sent to a specic Bitcoin address. This
sextortion spam scheme mixes a well-known existing online prob-
lem, spams, [16, 17, 29, 35, 36], while leveraging cryptocurrencies
as a new channel for illicit nancial transactions. It represents a
rst integration of the use of cryptocurrencies by members of the
spamming industry. Such spamming scheme is much simpler than
conventional spamming that requires, for example, links to aliate
marketing [29] for the sale of goods such as pharmaceutical prod-
ucts [16, 17] or counterfeit goods [36]. Indeed, sextortion spams cut
the upper-tail of the spamming supply chain: there are no product
shipments or hosting of illicit websites involved.
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Since 2018, sextortion spams have been distributed in a dozen
languages, most likely with the use of the Necurs botnet [13, 32].
Shultz [32] already conducted a primary analysis of the sextortion
spammers potential revenues by inspecting 58,611 Bitcoin addresses
found in two sextortion-related spam campaigns lasting 60 days.
He concluded that a total of 83 addresses received approximately
$146,280. However, the author only summed incoming payments
without applying more advanced methods for tracing monetary
ows in the Bitcoin transaction graph, which have already been
applied for studying other forms of cryptocurrency-related cyber-
crime, such as ransomware [12, 28]. Shultz’s [32] ndings provide
a rst overview of a much bigger puzzle, which has yet to be uncov-
ered and understood. Moreover, the simplicity behind sextortion
spams — or any spams taking advantage of cryptocurrencies — may
inuence many to leverage this strategy, developing new threats
and/or oering dierent products or services to convince spam
recipients to send money to a cryptocurrency address. Uncovering
the potential returns of this scheme, as well as the level of sophisti-
cation behind these campaigns, may indicate the extent to which
this illicit scheme will be prevalent in the near future.
This research builds on unique and innovative methods to un-
derstand this new spamming scheme, providing insights into how
sextortion spammers operate and the extent to which they are
successful. To do so, we dive into a dataset of 4,340,736 emails re-
lated to sextortion, identify dierent threat campaigns and evaluate
spammers’ pricing strategy. Then, we extract Bitcoin addresses and
investigate transactions related to sextortion in the Bitcoin ecosys-
tem. Using the open-source GraphSense Cryptocurrency Analytics
Platform1, we project them onto transaction graphs by applying
the well-known multiple-input clustering heuristic [21, 30]. We
estimate spammers’ potential revenue through dierent techniques
and analyze patterns in the monetary ows. Summarizing, our
contributions are as follows:
(1) We develop a simple and ecient email bucketing heuristic
to syntactically group 4,340,736 emails into 96 sextortion-
related buckets, from which we manually derive 35 specic
campaigns, allowing us to overcome spammers’ obfusca-
tion techniques of changing words and sentences.
(2) We nd that sextortion spammers modify the amounts
asked in spams, based on the language in which the spam
is sent and the campaign in which it is included.
1https://graphsense.info/
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(3) From analyzing the 245 sextortion addresses active in the
Bitcoin blockchain, which we make available for research
reproducibility2, we nd that one single entity is likely
controlling the nancial backbone of the majority of the
sextortion campaigns studied.
(4) Filtering out unrelated transactions, we conclude that this
sextortion scheme generated a lower-bound revenue be-
tween $1,300,620 and $1,352,266 for an 11-month period.
(5) We nd that the holding period of sextortion payments is,
on average, 5.5 days and we track, to the best of our capac-
ity, monetary ows from spammers to known entities.
Our results show that sextortion spammers are somewhat so-
phisticated, developing pricing strategies before sending spams, yet
they are not tracking whether the developed strategies worked, as
Bitcoin addresses are reused among spams. We also nd that the
lower-bound revenues of sextortion spams are similar in magni-
tude compared to traditional spams [16, 17]. However, by cutting
the upper-tail of the spamming supply chain, sextortion spammers
make near $122,933 per month while facing little costs. These results
suggest that sextortion spams, or any spamming scheme using cryp-
tocurrencies to attempt at inuencing spam recipients to blindly
send money, are not likely to disappear, due to the lucrative returns.
The anti-spam community should thus focus on actively agging
these emails, preventing them to reach users’ inbox. We make our
research reproducible by publishing the 12,533 Bitcoin addresses
found in the 4,340,736 sextortion spams2.
In the following paper, we start by introducing the necessary
background on sextortion spams, summarizing what is currently
known about their characteristics and the protability of the spam-
ming industry, and providing an overview of known methods for
estimating illicit revenues using Bitcoin. Then, in Section 3, we
describe the simple and ecient email bucketing heuristic we devel-
oped to group emails in buckets and subsequently campaigns, as
well as the computations done on known Bitcoin addresses to ex-
pand the dataset and infer additional information from the Bitcoin
ecosystem. We present results about the spammers’ pricing strategy,
the reuse of Bitcoin addresses, the evolution of spamming revenues
as well as an analysis of the money ows in the subsequent sections.
We nish with a discussion and a conclusion summarizing the main
results of this study.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Since sextortion is a specic spamming scheme, we rst summarize
what is currently known about spam and the industry behind it
in general, before we present known facts about spam sextortion.
Then, we focus on protability of spam and summarize known
methods for measuring illicit cryptocurrency revenues.
2.1 Spam and the Industry behind it
Spam refers to the sending of in-mass “messages from economic
agents who do not have previous relationship with the customer
and who do not oer opt-out provisions” [29, p.96] or, put more
simply, “unsolicited bulk emails” [1]. Spam was rst attributed to
unwanted emails, but now refers to other kinds of undesirable
2https://github.com/MatteoRomiti/Sextortion_Spam_Bitcoin
messages, such as unsolicited text messages [3], calls [37], social
media posts [3, 33] and fake reviews [11].
The spamming industry, referring to all economic agents in-
volved in the spamming business, has been thriving since the 1980’s
with the creation of the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)
sender push technology [29]. Since its inception, this industry has
been closely related to aliate marketing [29], advertising various
products and services, such as pharmaceutical products [16, 17],
counterfeit goods, online dating and search engine optimization
services [36].
Stringhini et al. [36] suggested that the lower-tail of the spam-
ming supply chain is segmented, with each participant specializing
in one activity. They also point out that traditional spammers buy
emails lists, rent botnets and use them to send spam. Target email
lists are bought from email harvesters, which are individuals or
groups of individuals crawling the web and compiling large lists of
emails for sale. Then, botnets would be rented by spammers to send
their unsolicited emails [14, 17, 35]. Botnets enable spam to be sent
in bulk from a vast pool of infected hosts with geographic diversity,
especially if the infected host is located in a Dynamic Host Protocol
(DHCP). In such case, the IP address of the infected host may be
constantly changing, thus hardening the agging process by the
anti-spam community [29].
While Stringhini et al. [36] suggested a segmented industry at
the lower-tail, Kanich et al. [16] investigated the Storm spam botnet
and concluded that the spamming industry would be more verti-
cally integrated, with the harvesters, the botnet owners and the
spammers coming from the same organization.
Then, a study conducted by Levenchenko et al. [19] showed that,
at the upper tail of the traditional spamming supply chain, several
operations need to be performed. The authors discussed, more
precisely, spam campaigns related to pharmaceutical and software
products and explained that sending spam is only a small part of the
whole operation. Once in a virtual inbox, spammers depend on the
propensity of email recipients to click on the URL displayed in the
message and for the URL to remain available. Although this process
seems simple at rst, Levenchenko et al. [19] explain that spammers
need to orchestrate and plan an elaborated operation to avoid URL
and domain blacklisting, as well as website take downs by Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) and registrars. Such an operation is quite
sophisticated and requires URL redirection strategies, dealing with
bullet-proof hosters and even sometimes using fast ux domain
name system (DNS). Moreover, spammers must maintain credible
websites, provide reliable payment processes and nd banks that
will accept to receive payments, regardless of the illicit activity
being conducted. Lastly, they may have to acquire the product
and deliver it to the customer and/or develop the service. Since the
supply chain for the spamming of counterfeit products and software
services is quite complex and requires sophisticated operations,
spammers can also resort to enterprises with lenient values to
conduct business with, sending spams on their behalf [29].
2.2 Spam Sextortion
With the rise of Bitcoin as a preferred currency for specic illicit
activities, such as ransomware [12, 28], some spammers have re-
turned to spamming through emails while exploiting a new strategy:
2
sexual extortion that requires payments in Bitcoin. The scheme,
known as spam sextortion, is simple: it aims at extorting money
from spam recipients through the threat that compromising pho-
tos or videos will be sent to the recipients’ contacts if the amount
asked in Bitcoin is not paid. Such spamming scheme represents a
new approach that leverages Bitcoin and is cost-saving: it cuts the
spamming supply chain to its bare minimal as there is no need to
develop sophisticated techniques to monetize the scheme.
Indeed, the upper-tail of the supply chain is butchered when
considering sextortion spam campaigns: the spam is built on a
false threat that if believed by the spam recipient, will generate an
amount of money to the spammers. There are no URL redirections
and bulletproof hosting to deal with, credible websites to maintain,
or business partners to nd. The cost of running a sextortion spam
campaign is thus largely reduced compared to traditional spams,
which may explain why, in the past year, such spams have been
prevalent. To this date, sextortion spams have been discussed in mid-
2018 in a short article from IBM X-Force [13] as well as a security
blog written by Schultz (2018) [32]. We review both articles below.
The rst short article [13] presents examples of spam sextortion
and hypothesizes that these spams have been distributed since Sep-
tember 11, 2018, by the Necurs botnet, a well-known spamming
botnet [18]. According to the blog, the amounts asked varied be-
tween $250 and $550 and the threat was found to be distributed in
seven languages: English, German, French, Italian, Japanese, Ko-
rean and Arabic. The second article, written by Schultz [32] in 2018,
investigated two sextortion campaigns (a total of 233,336 emails)
that were received by SpamCop, a reporting spam service 3, be-
tween August 30 and October 26, 2018. The author found additional
languages: Czech, Spanish, Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish, illus-
trating that the sextortion spamming scheme is inevitably global.
Schultz also found that Bitcoin addresses displayed in spams are
reused throughout sextortion messages: the spammers do not even
bother to generate a unique address per message. This is further
supported in the previous article [13] which stated that one Bitcoin
address was reused in 3 million messages. Schultz [32], moreover,
found overlaps of Bitcoin addresses in sextortion spam emails and
a spam where a Russian girl promised to send an explicit video in
exchange for $40 in Bitcoins.
These ndings suggest that there might be a common nancial
backbone behind the spam campaigns. However, a more detailed
picture on the structure of that backbone and revenues made by
sextortion spammers are still missing. But, since spammers clearly
tend to reuse addresses, we can infer and show later in this paper
that such a picture can be drawn using state-of-the-art methods for
tracing and tracking monetary ows in Bitcoin.
2.3 The Potential Protability of Spams
Traditional spamming is a lucrative business: in 2008, Kanich et
al. [16] inltrated a botnet for 26 days and found that 350 million
pharmaceutical spams resulted in 28 sales with a total revenue of
$2,731.88, which corresponds to a conversion rate of 0.00001%. The
authors claim that, when extrapolating their ndings to additional
bots, the revenue could go up to $9,500 per day and thus $3.5 million
per year. Later, the same authors conducted a second study [17] in
3https://www.spamcop.net/
which they investigated multiple spamming campaigns and found
an even more protable picture: spammers would earn, on average,
$50 per purchase and the revenues per spamming campaign would
range between $400,000 and $1,000,000 per month per aliate
program. In both cases, however, such revenues do not include
the costs of additional activities related to traditional spams, such
as bullet-proof domain hosting or shipping.
Botnet operators are, as discussed above, key actors in the indus-
try and Stone-Gross et al. [35] estimated their potential prot. They
estimated the costs of maintaining the Cutwail botnet infrastruc-
ture at $1,500 to $15,000 on a recurring basis (with 121,336 unique
IP addresses online per day) and concluded that botnet owners
must have made between $1.7 to $4.2 million in prot in the past
approximate year. According to this same study, spam-as-a-service
can be purchased at a price of $100-500 per million of spams or
botnets can be rented at a price of $10,000 per month for 100 million
of spam emails.
Rao and Reiley [29] identied three tactics for estimating spam-
ming revenues sent through botnets: monitor a botnet and a market
for spams, hijack a botnet and estimate the number of sales made,
or evaluate the number of completed orders on a website related to
spam by looking at the sequential order IDs in the URL.
In our work, we follow a new tactic, one that can be added
to Rao and Reiley’s [29] typology. The tactic aims at estimating
illicit sextortion spam revenues by analyzing associated Bitcoin
transactions, which are openly accessible on a ledger, also known
as the blockchain.
2.4 Estimating Illicit Bitcoin Revenues
While Bitcoin’s share of the cryptocurrency market is shrinking,
it still remains the predominant cryptocurrency encountered in
cybercrime investigations [4]. Hence, tracking and tracing mon-
etary ows has become a de facto standard forensic method for
cybercrime investigations and is now supported by a number of
commercial (e.g., Chainalysis4, CipherTrace5) and open-source tools
(e.g. BlockSci [15]) and analytics platforms (e.g., GraphSense6).
These tools rely on three main complementary techniques: rst,
they apply various clustering heuristics to group multiple addresses
into maximal subsets (clusters) that can be likely assigned to the
same real-world actor. Multiple-input clustering [25, 30], for in-
stance, leverages the idea that each Bitcoin address has a private
key that is required to sign a transaction and spend the money
associated with it. Thus, if two addresses are used as inputs in a
transaction, the private keys of the two addresses must be used to
sign the transaction and, subsequently, be accepted by the peer-to-
peer network and added to the public ledger. These two addresses
can thus be attributed to the same real-world entity, known as a
cluster. A previous study argued that the multiple-input clustering
heuristics are surprisingly eective due to the reuse of addresses
and report that super clusters covering thousands of addresses typi-
cally represent gambling sites, exchanges or large organizations [8].
Moreover, Nick (2015) [26] tested the heuristics on 37,000 wallets
4https://www.chainalysis.com/
5https://ciphertrace.com/
6https://graphsense.info
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and found that it successfully guessed, on average, 68.9% of all ad-
dresses belonging to a wallet. Next to that heuristics, other studies
have proposed to form clusters based on change addresses (c.f., [21])
or other behavioral patterns [22].
The second technique is to create network abstractions from the
underlying blockchain in which nodes represent addresses or real-
world actors by their set of addresses (clusters) and edges represent
transactions carried out between addresses or clusters [9, 30, 34].
This provides the data structure required for tracking and tracing
monetary ows within a cryptocurrency ecosystem. Finally, address
nodes in those networks are enriched with so-called attribution tags,
which are the key for de-anonymizing actors within an ecosystem;
and therefore, the most valuable asset in cryptocurrency forensics
tasks. An attribution tag associates a single address with some
real-world actor, such as the name of an exchange. The strength
lies in the combination of these techniques: a tag attributed to a
single address belonging to a larger cluster can easily de-anonymize
hundreds of thousands cryptocurrency addresses [6].
The eectiveness of the multiple-input clustering heuristics can,
however, provide misleading results if transactions were involved
in Bitcoin mixing, either through centralized mixing services (also
called tumblers) or through CoinJoin transactions. Centralized mix-
ing services act as middlemen and amalgamate dierent users’ funds
before creating new transactions in order to confuse the trail back
to the funds’ original source (c.f. [24]). A CoinJoin is a feature often
supported by wallet providers or dedicated platforms, which allows
several users to combine their funds as input of a single Bitcoin
transaction without sharing private keys [23]. Therefore, CoinJoins
must be taken into account when analyzing cryptocurrency ows
and a number of detection heuristics are already available in tools
like BlockSci [15]. Furthermore, previous studies have shown that
mixing services are typically not used in the rst step, when victim
pay ransom amounts to some payment address controlled by the
attacker [28]. This suggests that mixing services are used at later
stages before cybercriminals want to cash out and turn tainted
funds into clean, spendable at currencies.
Above tools and techniques have so far been applied in two stud-
ies: Paquet-Clouston et al. [28] investigated modern ransomware
strains that encrypt a user’s computer les and asks for a ransom,
usually in Bitcoin, for the user to recover the encrypted les. They
collected a set of Bitcoin seed addresses related to ransomware
and expanded that set using the multiple-input heuristics. This
allowed them to trace ransomware monetary transactions related
to 35 ransomware families and to estimate that the lower-bound
revenue of these 35 ransomware families, from 2013 to mid-2015,
was near $12.7 million. Concurrently, Huang et al. [12] extracted
Bitcoin addresses from malware les related to ransomware and
followed a similar methodology. They ended up estimating that the
market for ransomware, over a two-year period, was worth near
16 million of US dollars. These two studies are among the rst to
provide reliable and reproducible measurement on the revenues of
a specic cybercrime: ransomware.
In this paper, we will build and expand on the methodologies
presented in those studies and investigate over four million sextor-
tion emails. This should provide insight into the money ow and
the potential protability of sextortion campaigns. Furthermore,
this study represents a rst analysis of the conjuncture between
the spamming industry and cryptocurrencies, a mingle that will
likely continue in the next years.
3 DATA AND METHODS
In the following section, we describe the dataset, including over 4.2
million spams, and the dierent methods used to lter and cluster
these spams in dierent campaigns. We also provide summary
statistics on the information extracted from each spam.
3.1 Raw Email Acquisition
Potentially relevant emails for this research were collected by set-
ting up a tailored spam lter in Virusfree’s email security solution
between 2018-10-02 until 2019-02-13. It ltered all emails contain-
ing the terms BTC or Bitcoin in singular or plural form AND were
classied as Spam by Virusfree’s spam lter AND originated from
an IP that is known by Virusfree as being a member of some bot-
net. Thus, none of the emails in our dataset reached the recipient.
Personally Identiable Information (PII) in emails, such as recipi-
ents’ email addresses, were masked before being handed over to us.
In total, the raw email dataset contained 4,360,575 emails. These
emails cannot be published for privacy reasons.
3.2 Email Bucketing
To cluster similar spams together, we had to group emails with
textual similarity into buckets and identify a representative tem-
plate for each bucket. In short, we had to nd sets of emails with
a relatively large intersection (high textual similarity). We tack-
led this problem by developing a simple email bucketing heuristic
that allowed us to eciently compute sets of syntactically similar
emails and retrieve a representative email template for each bucket.
Our heuristic is based on two observations we made upon manual
inspection of random email samples: rst, attackers introduce inten-
tional spelling or grammar mistakes or language variations, such
as synonyms, across the entire email in order to avoid spam lters.
Second, the end of the email contained the most important part of
the message, where the attacker explained to the victims what to
do. Based on these two observations, we dened our heuristic as
follows:
Denition 3.1. Let E be the set of emails in our raw dataset and
B the set of baskets representing similar sextortion emails.
(1) For each e ∈ E nd a basket b ∈ B ⊂ E with the represen-
tative email having the same l last words. If there is such a
basket, add e to basket b; otherwise, create a new basket
with et as representative template email.
(2) Compute the Jaccard similarity7 between the l last words
in all pairs of template emails et representing a basket and
merge two baskets if they have a similarity higher than a
threshold t .
In order to maximize Jaccard similarities within baskets, we
tuned parameters t and l by running experiments on 10% of the sam-
ple emails with all possible pairs (t , l) where t ∈ {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}
and l ∈ {20, 30, 40, 50, 60}. We found that parameters l = 50 and
t = 0.3 yielded maximum similarity with most buckets achieving
values greater than 0.8. We considered this a satisfactory result
7The Jaccard similarity between two sets S andT is dened as JS,T =
S ∩T /S ∪T 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Figure 1: Distribution of emails among the rst 100 baskets.
since spammers change textual contents in order to avoid spam
lters.
Overall, our email bucketing heuristic produced 1,810 buckets
with syntactically similar emails, each one having a representative
template email. Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of the
number of emails in the rst 100 baskets ordered by size and shows
that 96.1% of all emails fall into the top 10 buckets.
3.3 Identifying Buckets Related to Sextortion
However, at this point, it still remained unclear whether a bucket
contained emails related to sextortion or other emails mentioning
terms related to Bitcoin. Therefore, we investigated each template
representing a bucket and annotated it as being related to sextortion
or other. Since many emails were non-English, we used the Python
langdetect8 module for automatically detecting the email’s lan-
guage. In case of non-English templates, we used Google Translate9
to translate their bodies and kept an English translation alongside
the original template in our dataset.
This annotation procedure was carried out twice by two inde-
pendent annotators on all 1,810 representative email templates.
Disagreement on 12 syntactically corrupted email templates was
resolved by jointly investigating them in more detail and classifying
them as being sextortion. Finally, we ended up with a manually
curated corpus of 4,342,380 sextortion emails led into 96 buckets
representing 99.6% of the total number of emails shared with us.
3.4 Categorizing Buckets by Campaign
Then, we went through each of the 96 templates and found that
some of them should be grouped together. Yet, at this point, a
manual investigation was necessary and could not be automated.
Human interpretation was required because, although the sentence
structure and the wording diered among specic templates, the
meaning of the message and the nature of the threat were the same
and could only be grasped intellectually. This can be illustrated by
considering the two following templates:
Template No.0 (translated from Czech): Hi! As you may have
noticed, I sent you an email from your account. This means I have
full access to your account. Your account ([...@....com]) password: [...]
I’ve been looking at you for several months. The fact is that you have
8https://pypi.org/project/langdetect/
9https://translate.google.com
been infected with malicious software via the adult website you have
visited.
Template No.4 (translated fromCzech): Hello! As you may have
noticed, I sent you an email from your account. This means that I
have full access to your account. I’ve been watching you for a few
months now. The fact is that you were infected with malware through
an adult site that you visited.
In template No.0, the attacker has the email and the password of
the victim, whereas in template No.4, the attacker doesn’t. Yet, the
threat that follows is the same with dierent wording and sentence
structure. The buckets representing template No.0 and No.4 should
thus be merged, as they encompass the same campaign.
To ensure that our manual investigation was sound, we per-
formed three iterations: going three times manually through each
template and grouping them only if specic features around the
threat were the same, even though sentence structures and wording
diered. Based on this template analysis, a total of 19 campaigns,
encompassing at least two buckets or more, were found. These
19 campaigns include 80 of the 96 buckets. The 16 remaining buck-
ets that are not grouped still represent a campaign by themselves.
Overall, 35 distinctive sextortion campaigns were found and they
represent our nal dataset.
Table 1 presents the specic features of 15 campaigns that were
detected in the investigation above. It shows, for example, that
Campaign D represents a merged group of templates that mentions
the presence of an international hacking group while Campaign
G represents another that states that the attacker comes from the
DarkNet. Campaign F, on the other hand, details two options to
the email recipient: not to pay and live in shame or pay and live
safely, while Campaign L mentions the exact Common Vulnerability
Exposure (CVE) used to infect the device.
After having identied buckets related to sextortion and having
categorized them by campaign, we extracted the following data
points from each email in those buckets: the amount asked10 nor-
malized in USD, the time when an email was sent from its Date
eld in the header, the user’s alleged password (or phone num-
ber) mentioned in the email, and the Bitcoin address the victim is
supposed to send money to. We dene all bitcoin addresses found
in the spams as sextortion payment address. Table 2 provides sum-
mary statistics on the information extracted from the top 15 baskets
representing 99.0% of all emails in our dataset. We also identied
four campaigns (not shown in Tables 1 and 2) that did not involve
hacked email accounts and passwords, but phone numbers.
3.5 Finding Sextortion Payment Addresses
From the 96 considered sextortion-related buckets, we extracted
12,533 Bitcoin seed addresses, but found that only 245 of them re-
ceived funds. We consider these 245 as being our set of seed ad-
dresses.
Next, we used the GraphSense Cryptocurrency Analytics Plat-
form11 to expand these seed addresses to maximal address subsets
(clusters) computed over the entire Bitcoin blockchain from its in-
ception until April 30th, 2019 (block 573,989). GraphSense applies
10Amounts were asked in the following currencies: USD, EUR, GBP, NOK
11https://graphsense.info
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Table 1: Distinctive features of 15 sextortion spam campaigns
Campaign Key Distinctive Features for each Campaign
A A Trojan virus exploited the device and an anti-virus can’t detect it as a "Trojan Driver" updates the signature every 4 hours
B RDP was exploited with a keylogger and the device was infected while watching compromising videos
C The primary goal was to lock the device and ask for money, but a sextortion ransom was asked instead
D The attacker is a member of an international hacking group and knows all of the recipient’s secrets
E A RAT software was installed on the device and discovered compromising videos
F A virus infected the device via porn websites and two options are presented: pay or not pay
G The attacker is known on the DarkNet and hacked the recipient’s mailbox a long time ago
H The attacker is from China and the email is a last warning
I The recipient’s password was intercepted via a porn website and a malicious software now intercepts the password every time it is changed
J A Trojan with remote access was installed on the device and the device was additionally hacked through porn websites
K The nationality of the attacker is mentioned as an excuse for the poor language structure of the spam
L The attacker claims to be a spyware software developer and mentions the CVE used to compromise the device
M The email recipient’s cellphone was compromised and all pictures and videos backed up by the attacker
N The email is presented as a serious last warning
O A Trojan infected the device and downloaded all of the recipient’s private information, the camera also captured "soloing"
Table 2: Summary statistics on data points extracted from top 15 baskets.
Basket Campaign Language #Emails Range [$] Currency Time Period #Passwords (Unique) Jaccard Mean (Var)
0 A cs 1,811,062 280 | 290 EUR 2018-12-02|2018-12-23 387,943 (283,828) 0.98 (0.0)
1 E cs 594,904 250 | 550 USD 2018-09-06|2018-11-12 544,448 (388,809) 0.96 (0.0)
2 B en 415,925 300 | 7,000 USD 2018-09-22|2019-01-24 414,785 (297,514) 0.91 (0.0)
3 C en 345,969 695 | 899 USD 2018-10-29|2019-02-12 303,910 (234,354) 0.92 (0.0)
4 A en 331,742 500 | 1,000 USD,EUR 2018-11-30|2019-02-13 0 (0) 0.82 (0.01)
5 G cs 256,252 200 | 290 USD 2018-09-27|2018-11-06 256,252 (189,173) 0.98 (0.0)
6 D cs 186,723 250 | 250 USD 2018-09-03|2018-11-24 0 (0) 1.0 (0.0)
7 F en 146,709 700 | 750 USD 2018-12-20|2019-02-15 111,114 (97,485) 0.94 (0.0)
8 L en 100,395 700 | 999 USD 2018-10-14|2019-01-15 54,883 (49,721) 0.86 (0.01)
9 C en 44,790 500 | 1,000 USD 2018-09-09|2018-12-27 44,454 (26,920) 0.93 (0.0)
10 A de 19,850 336 | 784 EUR 2018-12-07|2019-01-21 0 (0) 0.99 (0.0)
11 E ko 19,683 400 | 500 USD 2018-09-14|2018-12-26 0 (0) 1.0 (0.0)
12 G en 18,314 200 | 2,000 USD 2018-09-18|2019-02-13 0 (0) 0.79 (0.03)
13 C de 13,732 336 | 504 EUR 2018-11-24|2019-01-22 0 (0) 0.99 (0.0)
14 F en 12,476 500 | 7,000 USD 2018-09-13|2019-01-15 12,213 (1,472) 0.45 (0.0)
the well-known [5, 31] multiple-input clustering heuristics for that
purpose. The underlying intuition is that if two addresses (i.e., A
and B) are used as inputs in the same transaction while one of these
addresses along with another address (i.e., B and C) are used as
inputs in another transaction, then the three addresses (A, B and
C) must somehow be controlled by the same entity [21], who con-
ducted both transactions and therefore possesses the private keys
corresponding to all three addresses. This heuristic can fail when
CoinJoin transactions [23] are taken into account, because they
combine payments from dierent spenders that do not necessarily
represent one single entity. Being aware of this problem, we ltered
these transactions out using detection heuristics similar to those
found in the tool BlockSci [15] before applying the multiple-input
heuristics. Also, as discussed in Section 2.4, we assume that victims
do not directly pay into other centralized mixers.
We found that 49 seed addresses could not be associated with
clusters, while the remaining 196 appear in 52 dierent clusters.
Table 3 reports the number of addresses as well as the rst trans-
action date of the top 10 clusters sorted by amounts received in
US dollars. We noticed that two clusters, cluster 0 and 1, diered
signicantly from the others in terms of the number of addresses,
the total amount received and the date of the rst transaction. Based
on attribution tags retrieved from walletexplorer.com, we were able
to identify one of these clusters (0) as being related to the exchange
Luno.com. The real-world identity of the other cluster is unknown,
but from its characteristics, we concluded that it represents, most
likely, an exchange or another large real-world entity. From these
observations, we decided to disregard the addresses included in
these two clusters, keeping only their seed addresses.
Overall, when disregarding the two large address clusters, we
expanded our dataset to 485 address. We assume that the addresses
included in this expanded dataset represent sextortion payment
addresses as well.
3.6 Filtering Sextortion Transactions
With 485 sextortion payment addresses at our disposal, we tried
to identify Bitcoin transactions representing payment from email
6
Table 3: Summary statistics of top 10 clusters by amounts
received.
Cluster #Seed Addresses #Addresses Amount Received [$] First Tx
0 1 398,777 2,155,478,411 2013-03-22
1 3 564,595 2,110,090,570 2016-03-21
2 16 52 240,221 2018-09-25
3 15 25 200,146 2019-01-07
4 13 22 178,245 2018-10-30
5 6 19 108,652 2018-10-25
6 13 37 103,660 2018-09-12
7 8 29 77,062 2018-09-10
8 3 11 50,106 2019-01-24
9 11 47 36,661 2018-10-15
recipients to spammers. Since sextortion payment addresses could
also be used for other purposes, or other kinds of spamming
schemes as discussed in [32], we approached this problem heuris-
tically and subsequently employed three ltering methods with
varying degrees of restrictiveness on all incoming transactions. This
allowed us to gradually restrict the set of possible payments to a
very narrow, lower-bound estimate.
Inspired by previous work that estimated the ransomware mar-
ket, while considering potential collectors (addresses used to aggre-
gate money) in the dataset [28], we developed a rst lter, dubbed
CollectorFilter. This lter removes transactions with at least one
sextortion address among the inputs and one in the outputs, which
indicates money owing among the group of spammers, and not a
victim’s payment.
The second ltering method, named RangeFilter selects only the
transactions where sextortion addresses received payments within
the range found in spams, or more precisely, of [(1−p) ∗min S, (1+
p) ∗max S], where p = 0.1 is a tolerance factor taking into account
possible exchange rates oscillations between the email time and
the payment time, and S is the set of all the ransom amounts we
found in the emails.
The third lter, dubbed Moving-MoneyFilter removes transac-
tions with only one output, also known as exact-amount pay-
ment [2]. Such lter assumes that these transactions represent
a sender using the send maximum amount feature of a wallet to
transfer funds from one address to other, both addresses belonging
to the mentioned sender.
4 ANALYSIS
After having collected Bitcoin addresses and transactions related to
sextortion campaigns, we start our analysis by analyzing spammer’s
pricing strategies. Then we examine reuse of Bitcoin addresses
across campaigns, analyze the accumulation of revenues longitudi-
nally, and provide some deeper insights into the monetary ows
involved in sextortion spam.
4.1 Spammers’ Pricing Strategies
Sextortion spams in our dataset have various threat structures,
known as campaigns, and are written in dierent languages. We
hypothesized that sextortion spammers could follow dierent pric-
ing strategies, based on the language in which the spam is sent
and/or the content of the campaigns, as well as whether the email
contains personal information, such as the recipient’s password or
phone number.
First, to systematically assess whether spammers consider lan-
guage in their pricing strategy, we tested the following null hypoth-
esis between language pairs: the mean amount asked in a certain
language does not statistically dier from other languages. We com-
puted pairwise t-tests, comparing ransom amounts asked based on
the language in which the spam was sent. For each language, we
conducted normality tests on amounts asked as discussed in [20]. If,
on average, the random samples tested followed a normally shaped
distribution, we kept the samples to compute pairwise t-tests. If not,
we concluded that the samples were too small in size for the t-tests
to be robust to non-normality. We thus disregarded them in the
analysis below to avoid doing a Type 1 error (wrongfully rejecting
a null hypothesis) when comparing means of amounts asked. More-
over, since variances among spams grouped per language and per
campaign showed heteroscedasticity, we applied Satterthwaite cor-
rection on sample variances by computing the Welch-Satterthwaite
t-test, a test that is designed for unequal variances [27, 38]. Lastly,
to adjust the p-values for multiple comparisons we used the con-
servative Bonferroni correction.
The pairwise t-tests revealed that the means of amounts asked
per language are signicantly dierent for most of the pairwise
comparisons. To discuss these results, Figure 2 presents the mean
amounts asked per language, along with the standard deviations in
blue and the 1.96 standard mean errors in red. Overlaps of standard
mean error bars indicate that the dierence between means is zero.
If we look at pairwise comparisons over all campaigns and lan-
guages in Figure 2a, we nd that the means of amounts asked in
English spams are signicantly higher than the means of amounts
in all other languages, except Slovenian. We can also observe that
the means of amounts asked in German, French, and Dutch are not
signicantly dierent. In the lower range of mean payments asked,
we nd Polish, Italian, and Spanish, which do not signicantly dier
within their group, but do signicantly dier from other languages
demanding higher amounts. Japanese, Slovakian and Norwegian
spam samples did not pass the normality tests discussed above.
Overall, spammers ask higher amounts, on average, for spams sent
in English, Slovenian and Korean and lower amounts, on average,
for spams sent in Polish, Italian and Spanish.
Next, in order to assess if this nding was robust within one
single campaign, we looked at amounts asked per language in Cam-
paign A, a campaign that contains six languages and more than
two million spams. Based on Figure 2b and pairwise t-tests be-
tween each language in Campaign A, we nd that the means of
amounts asked in English are signicantly higher than all other
languages. The means of amounts asked in Dutch are also signif-
icantly higher than all other remaining languages. The means of
amounts asked in Czech spams are signicantly higher than Span-
ish and Italian spams, but are not signicantly dierent with Polish
spams. Overall, we nd similar results, with recipients of English
spams facing higher amounts asked than recipients of spams in all
other languages. Also within Campaign A, Spanish spams asked
the cheapest amounts, on average.
We looked if amounts asked diered per campaign. To avoid
grasping a language eect, we selected only English spams, a lan-
guage encompassing 1,427,311 spams and 31 campaigns. Then, we
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Figure 2: Mean amounts asked per Language and per Campaign
selected the 14 campaigns that passed the normality test mentioned
above. As shown in Figure 2c and based on pairwise t-tests, we nd
that there are signicant dierences in the means of amounts asked
depending on the campaign. For example, the means of amounts
asked in Campaign G are signicantly lower than all other cam-
paigns except Campaign X. Amount asked in Campaign W are also
signicantly higher than amounts asked in all other campaigns.
Campaign F also shows that amounts asked in English vary greatly.
Overall, we nd that there are signicant dierences in the amounts
asked per campaign.
Lastly, we found no signicant dierences between spams sent
with and without the recipient’s password or phone number, even
when controlling for the language in which the spam was sent and
the campaign in which it was classied. Spammers do not ask for
higher amounts when they have additional information from the
recipient. In summary, from these ndings, we can conclude that
sextortion spammers consider language in their pricing strategy
within and across campaigns. They also ask for dierent amounts
depending on the campaigns.
4.2 Passwords and Public Data Breaches
Schultz [32] hypothesized that the emails and passwords used by
sextortion spammers come from publicly available data breaches. To
explore this hypothesis, we selected all unique clear text passwords
(as email addresses were masked for privacy purposes) from the
spamming dataset. We then created a list of clear text passwords that
were seen only once in the dataset, to avoid passwords such as 12345,
and that comprised at least four characters, to avoid passwords such
as !!.
This yielded a list of 632,688 unique passwords. We fetched 21
publicly available data breaches (e.g., MySpace, Linkedin, Twitter,
Yahoo, 665KK), encompassing nearly 800 million passwords. Due to
computational limits, we randomly selected 25% of the passwords
included in the list above and investigated whether they were con-
tained in one of these breaches. A total of 80,944 passwords were
found to be a match. In short, about 51% of our randomly selected
password samples used by sextortion spammers were passwords
found in previous clear text data breaches. These ndings strongly
support the idea that sextortion spammers use publicly available
data breaches to populate the content of their spams.
4.3 Reuse of Bitcoin Addresses across
Campaigns
When investigating Bitcoin addresses extracted from the buckets
listed in Table 2, we noticed that addresses and associated clusters
are reused across buckets and sextortion campaigns, conrming
similar observations made by researchers previously [13, 32]. More
specically, we observed that 50 clusters appear in at least two
distinct baskets, and from this, we hypothesized that the nancial
revenue streams of a large majority of sextortion campaigns are
controlled by a single real-world entity despite their semantic and
language dierences.
We evaluated our hypothesis by creating an undirected graph
abstraction from the 96 buckets that were identied as being related
to sextortion campaigns. Nodes in the graph represent buckets
while edges between nodes indicate shared clusters or shared seed
addresses among two buckets. Thus, an edge between two nodes
indicates that access to funds collected from sextortion victims is
controlled by the same real-world entity, holding the private keys
of some addresses included in both nodes.
When analyzing that graph abstraction, we found that the over-
all graph consists of 4 disconnected components, with one giant
component covering 56 out of 96 nodes, which include 99.4% of the
emails and 72% of the sextortion addresses. Two other disconnected
components have only three nodes while the last component has
two nodes. All the remaining nodes are disconnected. Figure 3
represents the giant component and shows the nancial connec-
tions between buckets and campaigns identied by overlapping
Bitcoin clusters or addresses. Red edges indicate that the connected
buckets share at least one Bitcoin address. Black edges denote in-
tersections in the set of addresses (clusters) associated with two
connected bucket nodes. The strength of an edge indicates the num-
ber of shared entities (either clusters or addresses) and node colors
represent campaigns.
In summary, our analytics strongly indicates that a large majority
of the nancial revenue streams generated by sextortion spam
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Figure 3: Relationship among sextortion buckets, cam-
paigns, bitcoin addresses and clusters.
can essentially be attributed to a single real-world entity. We note
that this does not necessarily imply that all sextortion campaigns
are designed and carried out by a single person. It is more likely
that botnet infrastructures, which can be rented by spammers, are
nowadays designed with nancial features that handle the creation
of Bitcoin addresses, and potentially handle the nancial revenue
streams within the Bitcoin ecosystem. However, more research on
the matter is needed.
4.4 Sextortion Revenues
Next, in order to create reliable and reproducible statistics on the
protability of sextortion spam, we estimated the protability of
sextortion spams based on the emails contained in our dataset.
Since our observation period covers ve months (2018-10-02 until
2019-02-13), we also wanted to understand how the revenue stream
evolved over time.
To gain insight into the overall protability, we rst quantied
revenues with various lter settings: we applied the CollectorFilter
(1) and the RangeFilter (2) presented previously on all incoming
transactions of the expanded dataset, providing a reasonable rev-
enue estimation. Additionally, we applied the Moving-MoneyFilter
(3). However, we considered the estimate including the third lter as
a conservative one. Indeed, the Moving-MoneyFilter could disregard
potential transactions related to sextortion, as victims could send
money to a sextortion address without providing a change address.
Table 4 shows the number of payments, as well as the total
amounts received by the sextortion addresses based on the dierent
ltering criteria presented above. It shows that the overall revenue
of sextortion spams lies between $1,300,620 and $1,352,266.
Figure 4 illustrates all the individual payments to sextortion
addresses and the cumulative sum over time. Although we collected
spams from September 2018 to March 2019, Figure 4 shows that
we captured payments before and after this period. The revenue
estimations thus include payments between June 2018 and April
2019. Figure 4 also shows that sextortion addresses related to the one
single component, discussed in the previous section, accounts for
Table 4: Number of received payments and estimated rev-
enues using dierent ltering criteria.
Filters #Payments Revenues [$] Revenues [BTC]
1+2 2,346 1,352,266 281.776
1+2+3 2,252 1,300,620 269.983
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Figure 4: Sextortion’s cumulative revenues combining dier-
ent lters and single payments to sextortion addresses.
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Figure 5: Histogram of holding periods considering the
amounts received by sextortion addresses. Each bin has a
width of 10 hours.
88.3% of the overall sextortion revenues. Moreover, from September
2018 to March 2019, we nd that sextortion addresses receive an
almost steady ow of payments, with slightly higher revenues
in October, November and January with $336,979, $286,462 and
$250,189 respectively. The average monthly revenue being $122,933.
4.5 Holding Periods and Monetary Flows
To better understand when and how victims’ coins change hands,
we investigated the holding periods of received payments and sub-
sequent monetary ows to other addresses or clusters.
A holding period is the time elapsed between the moment a
sextortion address received coins from a victim and the moment
these coins are spent. We found that holding periods vary between
few minutes and few months, with an average holding time of 5.5
days and a median of 3.8 days, as shown in Figure 5.
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Then, we investigated monetary ows that start from a victim’s
address (depth 0) and forward amounts to other addresses through
several hops. Technically, this corresponds to traversing a transac-
tion graph, in which nodes represent addresses and edges represent
transactions. In order to limit computational eorts, we stopped
traversing when we hit an address representing a known exchange
or when we encountered more than 100 nodes at a certain depth.
For the analysis, we only considered transactions that have been
agged as sextortion payments, based on the Collector- and the
Range lters, yielding 2,252 sextortion payments related to 33 ad-
dresses and 48 clusters. We did not consider the Moving-Money
lter because it might exclude payments where the victim does not
care about the change.
We found that all the coins sent from the victims to the sextor-
tion addresses have been moved to other wallets. Within two hops,
we already found entities representing known cryptocurrency ex-
changes, such as Huobi.com, CoinPayments.net, Cubits.com, and
again Luno.com, thanks to the attribution tags retrieved fromwallet-
explorer.com. These known entities, however, only received 3.8181
BTC, representing about 0.135% of the total estimated sextortion
revenues. Such nding would indicate that spammers do not neces-
sarily cash out within the rst hops. However, since our attribution
dataset is limited to walletexplorer.com, we cannot conclude with
certainty this assumption, as untagged clusters may represent ex-
changes or money-laundering services that we are not aware of.
As a rst explanatory exercise, we present in Table 5 all un-
known clusters found at depth 2, meaning the clusters that received
money from known sextortion addresses. As shown in this Table,
some clusters spent millions of dollars, were active years before
sextortion spams were rst seen, and completed thousands of trans-
actions. Considering these features, such clusters could represent
exchanges or money-laundering services. As an extra exercise, we
computed the proportion of sextortion revenues that were moved
to clusters that have a transaction that is older than June 2018. Such
criterion -June 2018- represents the month in which we observed
a rst sextortion payment in our dataset. Clusters being active be-
fore June 2018 could represent potential cash outs, since they are
older than the spammers’ observed activities. We nd a total of
48.218340 BTC, 17% of spammers’ revenue going through these
clusters, representing potential cash outs. However, this analysis is
arbitrary and further research is needed to determine what features
of a cluster (e.g. total amount spent, number of addresses, activity
period) can hint an individual that the cluster in which the coins
are owing, although untagged, is a potential cash out service.
5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we rst discuss our ndings about the limited so-
phistication of sextortion spammers. We then provide estimates
of spammers’ revenues and prots and lay down the limits of this
research.
5.1 The Somewhat Sophistication of Sextortion
Spam Operations
This study nds that sextortion spammers developed a large array
of threat strategies to convince spam recipients to pay the amount
asked: a total of 80 dierent campaigns were found. The amount
Table 5: Top 15 clusters by BTC received from victims at
depth 2.
Cluster Total Spent [$] First Tx #Txs Out BTC
466805936 113,082 2019-01-09 1 19.324660
374981799 52,789,437 2017-12-27 179 18.418278
363386240 2,110,090,569 2016-03-21 377,671 10.377687
452279937 16,690 2018-11-19 1 3.781298
426830314 36,454 2018-07-23 20 3.513247
477564438 17,636 2019-01-20 1 3.476584
329777716 154,186,706 2013-04-16 226,156 2.977402
484209796 488,989,966 2018-08-04 159,198 2.959614
498338351 27,513,490,714 2014-09-04 3,150,371 2.945446
310058166 6,016,682 2016-10-28 633 2.180812
490354283 1,344,877,122 2018-10-04 13,230 1.764936
469936395 11,736 2019-01-15 1 1.654278
468575380 33,950 2019-01-09 22 1.544722
496671952 3,421,775 2019-01-11 129 1.517212
386226499 9,883,607 2016-12-07 565 1.420000
asked also diered based on the campaign in which a spam was
included into. However, we couldn’t nd a precise reason as to why
a campaign would display higher average amounts compared to
other campaigns. Identied features, such as Campaign W stating
that both the device and the spam recipient’s phone were exploited,
or campaign G, mentioning that the attacker comes from the Dark-
Net, were insucient to nd why some campaigns would be asking
for higher amounts compared to others.
We also found that sextortion spammers adjust the price of spams
to the language in which the spam is sent. Our results showed that,
on average, English ($745), Slovenian ($698) and Korean ($500)
are charged higher amounts than Polish ($288), Italian ($284) and
Spanish ($249) recipients. This is in line with other related results:
Hernandez et al. [10] found that ransomware authors charged their
victims dierently depending on many variables, including lan-
guage. Another study found malware-as-a-service was sold at a
higher price on English websites compared to Russian ones [7].
Thus, our study nds that, similar to other illicit online activities,
spammers also conduct price discrimination based on language.
However, explanations as to why the language of a spam recipient
changes the amount asked by sextortion spammers are yet to be
discovered. There are many potential arguments, such as testing
dierent threat strategies or subjectively deciding that a specic
language-speaking population should be charged more. However,
such analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
We also found that spammers do not charge higher prices for
spams that include passwords and/or phone numbers. This is sur-
prising considering that these additional elements could make the
threat more convincing. Moreover, spammers do not seem to track
down which threat strategy is more ecient or which language-
speaking population pays more, as Bitcoin addresses are being
reused among spams, regardless of the campaign or the language
in which the spam is sent. Such ndings indicate two tendencies:
spammers do develop strategies related to the spam content, but
they do not track afterwards the success of their operations (which
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campaign paid more, for example). Their sophistication is thus,
limited.
Potentially, the fact that spammers do not track payments could
be related to the idea that botnet infrastructures are nowadays
designed with nancial features that handle the creation of Bitcoin
addresses, and possibly handle the nancial revenue streams within
the Bitcoin ecosystem. The sophistication would thus be limited to
pre-spamming activities.
5.2 Revenues and Costs of Sextortion Spams
Our research results indicate that one single entity is likely control-
ling the nancial backbone of the majority of sextortion campaigns
investigated in this study. Moreover, depending on the applied l-
ter, sextortion spams generated a lower-bound revenue between
$1,300,620 and $1,352,266 for an 11-month operation, or an average
of $ 122,933 per month, between June 2018 and April 2019 when
payments were captured.
Traditional spam was found to be as lucrative, with ndings on
revenues ranging from 3.5 million per year [16] to between $400,000
to 1 million a month [17], depending on the study. However, as
discussed above, sextortion spams cut the upper-tail of the supply
chain compared to the traditional spamming industry [19]. The
costs of sending sextortion spams are much lower than that the costs
of sending traditional spams related aliate marketing [29] or the
sale of pharmaceutical products [16, 17] or counterfeit goods [36],
as no third-party relationships are needed, nor product shipments
or hosting of illicit websites, for example.
Moreover, a large proportion of the passwords found in the
dataset were related to available data leaks and pastes. Sextortion
spammers are thus likely to use emails found online, through public
data breaches, rather than buy email lists from harvesters, as argued
in previous research [14, 17, 35]. The price of harvesting these
emails would thus be quite limited.
At another level, all evidences point to the idea that sextor-
tion spammers are using botnets to disseminate their spams, just
like traditional spammers. Indeed, two previous articles on sex-
tortion [13, 32] argued that this worldwide campaign was sent by
the Necurs botnet. This assumption was based on the geolocations
of the IP addresses sending the spams, which were similar to the
Necurs’s infected hosts. Our sextortion dataset was also created
partly through a lter that selected emails sent from IP addresses
that were known to be part of botnets, supporting this hypothesis
as well.
Moreover, according to Stone-Gross et al. [35], spam-as-a-service
can be purchased at a price of $100-500 per million of spams or
$10,000 per month for 100 million of spams. Kanich et al. [16] also
found that 350 million of spams soliciting pharmaceutical products
led to 28 sales. This means that 12.5 million of spams would need to
be sent for one sale to be conducted. Hypothesizing that the lower-
tail of the spamming industry is segmented [36] and that sextortion
spammers operated within these eleven months by renting a botnet
at a price of $10,000 per month for 100 million of spams [16], a
practice that was found in several previous research [14, 17, 35],
sextortion spammers would have paid a total of $110,000 to botnet
owners. This means that they would have made a lower-bound
prot of $1,190,620 and $ 1,242,266 for eleven months. Such estimate,
however, does not include, other costs, such as the costs of crafting
the spams or of cashing out through the Bitcoin ecosystem. Yet, this
potential prot magnitude shows that sextortion spamming is a
lucrative business that is likely to continue, especially considering
that steady ows of payments every month were observed in our
dataset.
5.3 Limits and Future Research
This research faces some limits that can drive forthcoming studies.
First, the dataset studied is based on emails that never reach the in-
tended recipients. The lower-bound estimates are derived from the
reuse of Bitcoin addresses by spammers in their sextortion spams.
Potentially, the reported numbers underestimate the magnitude
of the spammers’ revenues. Thus, possibly, our dataset represents
only a small proportion of a global campaign. The multiple-input
heuristic allowed us to nd many addresses related to sextortion,
but we cannot conrm that the expanded dataset is holistic. Fu-
ture research could reproduce our methodology with additional
addresses. Upcoming studies could also look into the potential con-
version rate of sextortion spams, a measure that we could not nd
due to our limited dataset.
Second, the address clustering method we applied in our study
is a best eort approach based on behavioral patterns such as reuse
of addresses across transactions. We cannot preclude that it unies
entities that have no association in the real world, or that it misses
to unify entities. Our method also relies on the availability and relia-
bility of attribution tags, which are currently harvested from public
sources (mainly walletexplorer.com) without a verication process
in-between. Future investigations that aim at understanding the
real-world actors involved in sextortion campaigns and associated
monetary ows clearly have to provide safeguards for ensuring the
evidential value of such kind of analysis, by recording, for example,
the provenance of attribution tags. Moreover, the tracking of money
ows is limited by these attribution tags. Upcoming research should
look into determining clusters’ features that can detect a potential
cash-out service, without the use of the attribution tag, allowing
the tracking to stop once such a cluster is found.
The expanded dataset may also include transactions that are
not related to sextortion spams. Indeed, Schultz [32] did nd one
example of an address being reused in sextortion spam and in a
scam where a Russian girl would send a video in exchange of a small
Bitcoin amount. Such spams were not found in our dataset nor was
the example provided by Schultz (2018) found in the campaigns
studied. Yet, we cannot exclude the possibility that the revenues
estimated include other kinds of spamming schemes that aim at
inuencing spam recipients to send money to addresses. Subsequent
studies should aim at understanding other schemes developed by
spammers to take advantage of cryptocurrencies and extract money
from spams recipients, an amalgamation that is unlikely to go away.
6 CONCLUSION
This study shows that spammers have upped their game: mixing the
cryptocurrency bitcoin with spams by trying to extort money from
spam recipients. This is done through a false threat: compromising
videos or photos will be sent to the recipient’s contacts if an amount
of money is not sent to a specic bitcoin addresses. We nd that
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sextortion spammers are somewhat sophisticated, following specic
pricing strategies, based on language and threat structures. Yet,
our ndings also indicate that they do not track whether their
strategies are successful, hence the idea of "somewhat". Moreover,
we conclude that sextortion spammers cut the upper-tail of the
spamming supply chain, reducing the spamming cost. Tracking
their nancial transactions in the Bitcoin ecosystem, we nd that
these spammers made a lower-bound revenue between $1,300,620
and $1,352,266 for an 11-month operation.
We conclude that sextortion spamming is a lucrative business
and spammers will continue to send bulk emails that try to extort
money through cryptocurrencies. Other schemes, dierent than
sextortion, but involving cryptocurrencies, will likely be developed
by spammers, allowing such industry to thrive. The anti-spam
community should thus focus on preventing these spams to reach
users’ inbox by agging messages that include cryptocurrency
addresses and that are coming from IP addresses that are known to
be part of botnets.
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